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exposes inhuman conditions of life in such a way 
that no other discipline can: ‘to make perceptible the 
imperceptible forces that populate the world, affect 
us, and make us become’.3
In the following paper we will examine Deleuze 
and Guattari’s paradoxical understanding of the 
work of art as a monument existing ‘in the absence 
of man’. If the work’s mode of existence is only ‘in 
itself’, if it is, as they put it, ‘self-preserving’, then 
this is so because of the ‘self-positing’ nature 
of sensations.4 The first part of our inquiry will 
therefore look into Deleuze’s understanding of 
sensations as ‘affects’ and ‘percepts’. We will do 
so by tracing one of its main conceptual sources 
in the phenomenology of Erwin Straus and Henri 
Maldiney.5 Secondly, to further investigate the work 
of art’s ‘monumentality’, we will turn to an essay of 
Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Valéry Proust Museum’, which 
in contrasting Valéry and Proust’s respective views 
of the museum as a mausoleum, will serve as a 
ground for formulating what might be called the 
Deleuzian ‘afterlife’ of art. 
The heart of the sensible
A closed environment, integrally human and made 
out of signs, where on can never lose oneself, where 
the hidden phusis is no more but the material of insig-
nificant significations, is not the world, and takes from 
man the resistance of alterity, hurting by that the heart 
of his plenary humanity.6
And death has come, the last cleaning lady.
Death comes. So she does the housework;
for the last time she has swept the floor,
she has put the works in order.
(Charles Péguy)1
Introduction 
In 1991, at the end of his life, Gilles Deleuze writes 
together with Félix Guattari What is Philosophy?, in 
which the last chapter ‘percept, affect and concept’ 
traces the singularity of art with regard to science 
and philosophy. They return here to some of the 
great themes of their art philosophy, among which 
their critical stance towards phenomenology and 
their own post-phenomenological concepts of 
aesthetic experience, such as ‘becoming-animal’ 
and ‘becoming-imperceptible’ – themes which 
express the assertion that aesthetic experience 
is a matter not so much of mental (reflective) 
judgement, but rather of the bodily participation 
in material conditions that exceed the human. In 
this important essay, the work of art is repeat-
edly conceptualised as a monument, be it with 
the paradoxical nuance that it is never something 
commemorating a past.2 The work of art, they write, 
is a composition (composé) of sensations that are 
directed at nothing outside themselves – thus it 
refers not to an act of creation that preceded it and 
neither does it narrate or depict histories. Art is not 
an alibi for something that would chronologically or 
logically precede it, something it would both depict 
and represent. Rather, it establishes something that 
becomes passible only through the artwork itself, it 
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world. I become, only because something happens, 
and something happens (to me), because I become.11
For Straus, the traditional primacy of conscious-
ness does not suffice to uncover this double-sided 
unfolding of sensation. Rather, one is in need of a 
phenomenology of motor induction, as, for example, 
a temporal acoustic rhythm effectively pushes me to 
physically move. Its temporal pulsations effectively 
touch and invade my senses and do not merely 
bring about a figuration of content. As Straus writes 
with regard to dance: 
Sensation is linked to a vital movement by means 
of an internal connection […] No kind of association 
links the movement to sound or to rhythm, the move-
ment follows the music in an absolutely immediate 
manner.12
Straus calls this primary internal situation the 
‘pathic’ moment of sensation. Henri Maldiney – in 
an essay on Straus13 – writes in line with this that 
every sensation is marked by, on the one side, an 
emotional, pathic moment and, on the other side, a 
representational moment.14 The latter, which he also 
calls the gnostic or gnoseological moment, concerns 
speculative or pragmatical functions of the subject, 
such as perception and recognition. Whereas the 
pathic is connected to the how of being with the 
world, the representational and reflective turns to 
the what of the world and its objects. Maldiney gives 
the example of colour sensations. He writes: 
The immediate lyricism of the rosette of a cathedral is 
independent of the object that is represented. The play 
of colour induces in the spectator a spiritual and bodily 
movement that precedes every iconographical lecture 
of the stained glass window. The pathic moment of 
a colour sensation is expressed in this musical and 
rhythmic dimension of colours.15
For Straus, our sensibility to colours, forms and 
sounds is entirely constituted by this pathic moment. 
Deleuze refers us in his conceptualisation of sensa-
tion in What is Philosophy? to the phenomenologist 
Erwin Straus who, in his Vom Sinn der Sinne (1935) 
exposes in sensory experience (le sentir), a deeper, 
underlying feeling (ressentir), a specifically profound 
mode of sensing.7 The latter is not a return of the 
self to itself; it is neither reflection nor self-affection. 
Such a return would imply, in fact, a separated 
self, functioning as a subject opposed to an object 
that it would be faced with. Certainly, as has been 
known since Aristotle, sensory experience (aist-
hesis) is always a ‘sensing oneself’ sense, an aware 
sensing (ressentir); but the subject of sensation, 
Straus writes, ‘is not an isolated and solitary subject 
which, departing from its own self-consciousness, 
sketches and conceives a world which it tran-
scends’.8 Of course, the polarity between subject 
and object, between a subject that objectifies the 
world (or the art ‘object’), thereby distinguishing 
itself, cannot be denied; yet this duality is always 
secondary, and only possible arising from a more 
‘originary’ situation: ‘that of sensation’.9 More rigor-
ously, there aren’t two separate worlds, one interior 
and the other exterior, but only a double polarity of 
being with or in the world. Perception, hearing and 
our other senses do not only render an apparition 
of colour, sound and other sensations; they don’t 
merely offer us sensible impressions (Kant), but 
also ‘grab’ (saisissent) us and ‘arrange’ (disposent) 
us in the order of sensation.10 Not only do we grasp 
optic and acoustic phenomena of colours and tones, 
we are at the same time always also being grasped 
by them. Straus’ logic of the senses refuses to posit 
a subject in front of an object: sensation is always 
an event that unfolds in two directions at once, that 
of the world and that of the self. Whence a key 
sentence in Straus’ Vom Sinn der Sinne, which for 
Maldiney and Deleuze forms the basis for every 
possible aesthetic: 
In sensory experience there is an unfolding of 
both – read: sensation unfolds itself as both – the 
becoming of the subject and the becoming of the 
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left the order of sensation.’20 Thus, the certainty or 
indubitability (Descartes) of the aisthèsis does not 
have as a higher telos the truth of perception. The 
sensible is not a mere impulse for the mind to ascend 
towards higher spheres of understanding, but ‘has 
its own truth’, its own internal logic that exceeds the 
sterility of thought and can never be fully recuper-
ated by it. Straus and Maldiney explicitly go against 
the traditional hierarchy of the senses: not the 
visible (gnosis) but the tactile, not the gaze, but the 
touch become primary. For them, sensation must 
not be thought of in terms of the human capacity to 
intentionally attribute sense or meaning, but rather 
in terms of the bodily-affective, the horizon of the 
unexpected (cette surprise précède toute prise). 
Every form of presenting the world to oneself goes 
back to its presence as event (événement), to the 
pathic as our being-with-the-world, which precedes 
every opposition between subject and object and, 
moreover, discloses no intentional structure what-
soever. In line with this, in an interview with Claire 
Parnet, Deleuze speaks of art as resistance against 
the constant human ‘imprisonment of life’: 
Art consists of liberating the life that man has impris-
oned. Man doesn’t cease to imprison life, to kill 
life – ‘the shame of being a man’ […] The artist is the 
one who liberates a life, a forceful life, a life more than 
personal, it’s not his life!21
For Deleuze, art cultivates a moment of immediacy 
and indeterminacy which precedes any mediation: 
a pathos that always comes unexpectedly, and that 
as the epochè of presence momentarily disarms 
the subject.22 Aesthetic experience is about sensing 
the quality of an event, submitting oneself to the 
‘it happens’ rather than grasping ‘what happens’, 
to undergo a moment of indeterminacy without 
the shielding mediation of the discursive or ideal. 
‘Sensing,’ Straus writes, ‘is to knowledge what the 
scream is to the word.’23 Grasping the event in its 
singularity demands not a synthesis of the given 
by the imagination, no associations, but rather the 
It rises up from the depths of the body, as was the 
case with Cézanne, who described the colour that 
gave rise to to An Old Woman with a Rosary as a 
‘big blue red’ that fell into his soul.16 Maldiney sees in 
Cézanne’s colour an existential communication with 
‘a world still buried, which only his art will bring to 
light’. Cézanne himself described the initial moment 
of confronting the world prior to painting as being 
lost in the surrounding, a confrontation with chaos 
that precedes the act of creation: 
At that moment I am one with my painting (= not the 
painted canvas, but the world to be painted). We are 
an iridescent chaos. I arrive in front of my motive, and 
there I lose myself. […] We grow together. Once the 
night begins to fall, it seems to me that I shall not paint 
and that I have never painted.17
Maldiney defines Straus’ pathic communica-
tion – the abovementioned profound mode of 
sensing – by means of three criteria. First, it is a 
communication taking place on the level of the aist-
hèsis itself. Second, this mode of sensing is always 
a communication with phenomena themselves. The 
pathic belongs to the most ‘originary level of lived 
experience’; it is an ‘immediately present commu-
nication, intuitively-sensible, still pre-conceptual, 
that we have with phenomena’.18 Finally, the pathic 
communication with phenomena follows strict laws 
which hold for the phenomenality of the entire world: 
a set of singular sensations can serve as a general 
category for man’s being-in-the-world.19 
The most important trait for us at this moment 
is that Maldiney promotes the pathic to the true 
aesthetic dimension, which already points to a privi-
leged correlation between art and affectivity. Also, it 
is important to note that both dimensions, pathic and 
gnostic, do not harmoniously balance each other 
out: the pathic for Straus and Maldiney is always 
inevitably lost in perception, which must be seen 
as a first level of a reductive, objectifying process. 
‘With perception,’ Maldiney writes, ‘we have already 
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Deleuze states, paraphrasing Cézanne, is the land-
scape in the absence of man, the inhuman nature 
of the landscape, while the affect unfolds itself as 
a material zone of indeterminacy (indétermination) 
and indiscernability (indiscernabilité); for example, 
between man and animal. We are referred at this 
point to Straus’ Vom Sinn der Sinne: 
The great landscapes have a wholly visionary char-
acteristic. Vision is what of the invisible becomes 
visible… The landscape is invisible because the more 
we conquer it, the more we lose ourselves in it. To 
reach the landscape we must sacrifice as much as 
we can all temporal, spatial, objective determination; 
but this abandon does not only attain the objective, it 
affects us ourselves to the same extent. In the land-
scape we cease to be historical beings, that is to say, 
beings who can themselves be objectified. We do not 
have any memory for the landscape, we no longer 
have any memory for ourselves in the landscape. 
We dream in daylight with open eyes. We are hidden 
to the objective world, but also to ourselves. This is 
feeling.26
The enigma we are confronted with here is that 
of Cézanne’s ‘logic of the senses’: man absent 
from, but entirely within the landscape. Cézanne’s 
art, as Merleau-Ponty has also shown (Le Doute 
de Cézanne), consists of pursuing reality without 
leaving sensation, without giving up the sensuous 
surface. He therefore takes on a more difficult task 
than the musician, because the gnostic (specula-
tive, pragmatic) tends to dominate vision, whereas 
the pathic dominates in hearing: I face the visible, 
whereas the sonorous surrounds me and always 
presupposes my participation, my contagion even.27 
To reach the landscape and thus for vision to 
descend to the pathic, Cézanne must tear (arracher) 
the percept from perceptions of objects and the state 
of a perceiving subject. If art, for Deleuze, aims at 
‘rendering a moment of the world durable in itself, 
made to exist by itself’28, then this means it cultivates 
that moment when subjective perception dissolves 
demise of all syntheses, a radical openness, readi-
ness and receptiveness to that which announces 
itself.
Reality
Nothing more can be said, and no more has ever been 
said: to become worthy of what happens to us, and 
thus to will and release the event, […] to have one 
more birth, and to break with one’s carnal birth […].24
To understand what Deleuze and Guattari mean 
with the paradoxical determination of the work of 
art as a monument that does not commemorate but 
is directed only at itself, it is essential to look into 
their interpretation of the pathic, their own concep-
tualisation of the pathos of art. As noted, the work 
is literally a compound (composé), a composi-
tion of sensations, a self-sustaining composite of 
sensations. As Isabelle Stengers puts it, the term 
composition is explicitly directed against ‘any direct 
link between art and any kind of ineffable revelation, 
transcending words, demanding meditation and a 
sense of sacredness akin to negative theology’.25 
Hence, the literal use of the concept of force: the 
work ‘captures’ forces at work in the world and 
renders these sensible. Its effects are above all real 
and not merely imaginary: the image is not a mental 
given but a concrete, existing reality. 
To further determine this reality of the work of 
art, Deleuze distinguishes two kinds of sensation, 
‘percept’ and ‘affect’, which he explicitly opposes 
to human reading or mediation. Percepts are not 
perceptions of visible things, but sensations made 
visible or (in the case of literature) legible in such 
a way that perceiving them thwarts speculative or 
pragmatic distancing. Such visions or percepts are 
what remains when this distance is undone: the 
coincidence with something material that can only 
be sensed. Affects, on the other hand, are sensa-
tions ‘in action’, so-called non-human ‘becomings’, 
as they are contained in the work of art. The percept, 
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‘first’: it is the aesthetic (sensible) condition of possi-
bility of all the senses. Yet, how to understand the 
claim that this subterranean affective condition can 
only be sensed, being irretrievably lost in percep-
tion? ‘The aesthèsis as such,’ Maldiney writes, ‘is 
below the question of the real and of truth. Because 
the coincidence of seeing and seen in a vision (une 
vue) which is both vision (vision) and spectacle 
(aspectus) doesn’t arrange (ménage) any kind of 
space of play which might serve as a field of truth, a 
field of appropriation (or alienation) of the other and 
myself.’31 What is the invisible reality or ‘presence’ 
opened up in the pathic moment of sensation? And 
in what sense is it more ‘originary’ than that of the 
objectifying gaze? 
In the latter, in our visual understanding, our 
encounter with things always presupposes distance. 
This distance (in its turn ensured by the semantic 
horizon of language) guarantees the grasp of the 
intentional, objectifying gaze and prevents the 
confusion of the coalescence with things. When, 
however, the gaze itself is grabbed in a kind of 
distant contact and is, as it were, touched, we 
descend to an immediate experience of our being 
with and in the world, an immediate and unmedi-
ated presence (Gegenwärtigsein (Straus)). This 
presence is a dynamic sensation of exposure and 
dependency: the intimacy of the sensation, the 
coincidence of sensing and sensed, unfolds itself 
as exposure outside of oneself. Far from being 
a spherical plenitude or some kind of mystical 
harmony with the soul of the world, the pathic pres-
ence is a being in advance and outside of oneself, 
torn and in fraction: in line with the Latin etymology 
of presence, it designates the impossibility of coin-
ciding with oneself. The pathic encounter is, for 
Maldiney, a fact of existence in the way that Kant 
speaks of a ‘fact of reason’ with regard to the moral 
imperative. Yet, the pathic is not a causal begin-
ning, and it certainly does not designate a principle 
transcending the world. On the contrary, as Jean-
Louis Chrétien so nicely phrases it, with the pathic, 
in the perceived, thus elevating an underlying, invis-
ible force of life. Art is that discipline which grounds 
a moment of the world independent in itself, and 
which establishes this singular temporality sensible 
in such a way that its sense does not depend on an 
intentional act of a sensing subject. For Deleuze, 
the subject doesn’t have sensations: in sensing it 
attains access not to the ‘self’ (a supposedly given 
subject), nor to the ‘self’ of the other (the painter, 
musician, who is also a presupposed given with his 
subjectivity), but rather to the form or structure of 
the self: all that is left is the reality of a temporal 
relation in itself insofar as it forms a self. Sensation 
is not a metaphor for the access to the self, but the 
reality of that access: a singular, material, signifying 
but also asignifying reality.29
 
The affective and non-intentional ‘pathic’ moment 
of sensation is for Maldiney, too, the mark of the real 
as such. It induces, one might say, a ‘reality-effect’: 
it opens up the horizon of man in his existential 
entirety and not the domain of one of his ‘faculties’. 
Maldiney envisages here any kind of transcendental 
philosophy (most explicitly Kant, Hegel and Husserl) 
which reduces all action and effective passion to 
static faculties of doing or receiving, of acting or 
being affected, always already present, and always 
grounding, either in the subject or in conscious-
ness. The ordeal (pathos) which resonates in the 
term ‘pathic’ designates a crisis or unique force: 
the radical inversion through which sensation, far 
from being the affection by a sensible particular or 
by a punctual, sensible quality, opens me up to the 
world. The primacy of the aisthèsis designates not 
the perception of an object, but an affective commu-
nication with ‘the depth of the world, from which 
each thing holds its reality and to which it inversely 
confers a focal existence before its constitution into 
an object in perception’.30 
 
The fact that the pathic moment de jure precedes 
the gnostic moment does not mean that it excludes 
it, but rather, it designates it to being (onto)logically 
102
confused sensations which we carry with us in 
being born’.35 
How can a receptivity pushed to such a point 
of passivity – when strictly speaking nothing is 
intended or even felt – still be called a recep-
tivity? Maldiney uses the term ‘transpassibility’ to 
designate this ‘pure’ mode of sensing, such that 
nothing can be projected, intended or anticipated 
in it. ‘Transpassibility consists of not being passible 
to anything that might announce itself as real or 
possible. It is an opening without intention or drawing 
(‘une ouverture sans dessein ni dessin’), one which 
we are not passible to a priori.’36 Transpassibility 
is never a relation to a possibility but takes place 
‘below the question of the real and truth’, implying 
what Renaud Barbaras calls ‘a fundamental impos-
sibilisation’.37 However, what we are passible to 
does not oppose itself to the possible insofar as 
this relates to reality, which would suggest that it 
draws us from the possibilities of the subject to the 
laws of the real. Rather, sensation in the form of 
the impossible, as envisaged by Maldiney, opposes 
itself to both the possible and to the real. Thus, if 
we said above that the pathic is the mark of the 
real ‘as such’, we should be clear about its sense. It 
designates reality not as the ‘what’ of the world, the 
domain of objects (insofar as this is governed by 
laws therefore always measurable and predictable), 
but as the ‘how’ of being with the world. The veritable 
sense of the real is, for Maldiney, what is radically 
received, the correlate of an originary sensation. In 
this sense, the real is the unpredictable itself, that 
which never lets itself be announced or predicted, 
which does not appertain to any kind of legality, and 
which, in occurring, reflects neither my possibilities 
nor those of the world as the domain of legality. 
No man’s land
Following Maurice Blanchot, Deleuze defines the 
reign of the work of art as a universe or ‘chaosmos’ 
(Joyce) where the work: 
Maldiney envisages ‘the fundamental fragility of our 
exposure to the world, which is our only resource, 
and which is covered and obfuscated by fears and 
prejudices of all kinds, derisory fortifications which 
we edify against the lacerations of existence’.32 
How can philosophy access this primordial expe-
rience? Language offers us the being of things 
(l’être), but always through placing us in their 
absence: language can only narrate the world 
through negating its apparition, it cannot narrate 
being but only a relation to being, which is its nega-
tion, the obliteration of ‘the depth of the world, 
from which each thing holds its reality’.33 There is 
no language which could give us a direct access 
to being, but neither is there a pure, immediate 
and unmediated experience of being itself. For 
Maldiney, human existence must always be thought 
of as departing from the negation that is in progress 
in reality through becoming, the temporality which 
traverses our relations to things.34 Being cannot 
be thought of without nothingness (le rien), just as 
presence always arises from absence. Now, by 
determining the essence of sensation, this pathic 
moment, as a radically non-intentional receptivity, 
Maldiney aims to think of negativity as a fundamen-
tally ambiguous force that can open up the possible, 
but can also arise as impossibility; that is to say, as 
the being of nothingness, the presence of absence. 
Sensation does not necessarily have to be a contact 
with a given object but can just as well be the ordeal 
of nothingness. At the non-intentional ‘moment’ of 
sensation, we do not yet fictionally dispose over 
absent things, we do not yet relate to something 
possible. Far from it, in fact, since for Maldiney, 
the essence of sensation consists of a pre-logical, 
pre-reflexive receptiveness, a non-perceptive mode 
of sensing. Rather than a ‘sensible certainty’, the 
pathic designates a ‘sensible uncertainty’, a kind 
of original opacity that is constitutive of sensible 
consciousness, as envisioned by Cézanne when 
searching for an expression to describe ‘those 
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brilliance.’45 The Deleuzian figure of the artist 
represents an actor who delves into the intensive, 
chaotic presence of the flesh which he is, and who, 
by selecting in what happens (the accident), the 
force of the pure event (thereby participating in it), 
redoubles the cosmic, physical event into a pure, 
intensive becoming; ‘a counter-actualization’.46
A clear illustration of such a ‘pathic’ act of ‘puri-
fication’ can be found in The Logic of Sensation, 
where Deleuze discerns a consistent scheme of 
three logical moments essential to this Baconesque 
mode of production.47 The first moment is that of the 
‘cliché’, which the artist must fight.48 It stands for the 
figurative givens, the instituted forms of the object 
the painter wants to depart from, with their accom-
panying connotations and conventions. These initial 
‘lived’ givens are representational, narrative and 
figurative. Bacon, too, began with drawing the body 
from photos before decomposing it: an ambiguous 
‘detour’ via the world is inevitable and necessary. 
Because of it, sensation always runs the risk of 
being reduced to the sensational, which Deleuze 
still finds even in Bacon’s crucifixions of suffering 
flesh – Bacon, whose cruelty is nonetheless so 
far removed from the misérabilist cult. The second 
moment stands for a ‘catastrophic’, de-represen-
tational phase in which the artist confronts himself 
with chaos: the fusion of sensing and sensed, when 
all the forms of the world dissolve in that iridescent 
chaos of sensation evoked by Cézanne (note 16). 
Deleuze calls this the diagrammatic or de-territori-
alizing moment, the discovery of a materiality that 
presents itself as a pure material presence which 
is not reducible to an object that can be imagined, 
recalled or conceived by a subject. Finally, out of 
this pictorial ‘catastrophe’, an authentic Figure 
comes forth, a ‘chaosmos’ charged with ‘blocs of 
sensation’, which each artist attains by means of his 
own style – in Bacon’s case, figural. From the death 
of the form rises the truth of the becoming-flesh, the 
becoming-imperceptible, the excessive presence of 
[…] ceases to be secondary in relation to the model, 
in which imposture lays claim to truth, and in which, 
finally, there is no longer any original, but only an 
eternal scintillation where the absence of origin, in the 
splendor of diversion and reversion, is dispersed.38
 
The image as ‘simulacrum’: an originary copy. Its 
‘origin’ lies not outside, but in the very work itself. 
‘The poet,’ writes Blanchot, ‘does not survive the 
creation of the work. He lives by dying in it.’39 As with 
Mallarmé’s symbolic attempt to achieve the elocu-
tionary disappearance of the poet: ‘an experiment 
at grasping, as though at its source, not that which 
makes the work real, but the ‘impersonified’ reality 
in it: that which makes it be far more or still less than 
any reality’.40 
For Deleuze, the artist’s greatest difficulty is to 
make the work of art stand up on its own.41 This 
means that for sensation to preserve itself and 
be rendered durable, an artist must find a way to 
efface his own presence. The novelist cannot write 
only with memories, opinions, travels or fantasies. 
It is always a matter of eliminating everything that 
adheres to such personal traits – ‘everything that 
nourishes the mediocre novelist’ – and of reaching 
the percept as ‘the sacred source’: ‘through having 
seen Life in the living or the Living in the lived, 
the novelist or painter returns breathless and with 
bloodshot eyes’.42 In order to create true ‘blocs of 
sensations’, the artist is always obliged to face the 
chaos of his or her bodily depth, to embody and will 
the senselessness of the wounds which are inflicted 
on his life. As Deleuze writes with Joe Bousquet: 
‘My wound existed before me, I was born to embody 
it.’43 To ‘will’ such events does not mean to desire 
one’s wounds, but to will something in that which 
occurs, ‘something yet to come which would be 
consistent with what occurs, in accordance with 
the laws of an obscure, humorous conformity: 
the Event’.44 Bousquet: ‘Become the man of your 
misfortunes; learn to embody their perfection and 
104
The transcendental reduction envisaged here is, in 
the materialist terminology of Maldiney, a reduction 
to the pathic dimension of sensation, which always 
takes place in and through the artwork itself. The 
singularity of sensation thus lies in its being located 
in the immanence of an emptiness: it forces us to an 
atopic vision that a priori excludes any appropriation 
and permits only the experience of a temporality 
that comes from a chaotic reality in which humans 
have no proper place. As Maldiney writes: ‘An event 
is a rupture in the frame of the world and its appear-
ance is subtracted from the convoy of causes and 
effects. Likewise, the present of the appearance 
is a crack (déchirure) in the temporal frame.’53 In 
Deleuze’s terms, the pathic moment of sensation 
is constituted upon a primary order of intensive, 
bodily depth (viande) that links man to an inde-
pendent ontological reality inherent to becoming (le 
devenir) that verges on chaos. This event-ness of 
the work, which constitutes its solidity and durability, 
its monumentality, should, however, not solely be 
defined negatively by the absence of possibility and 
causality (as that which neither we nor the world 
are capable of), but also positively by its power 
to transform, by the revolution it introduces in our 
lived reality. In Maldiney’s terms: ‘As long as man 
is capable of astonishment, art lives. With it man 
dies.’54
The museum as mausoleum
For art, dying does not mean to disappear but to 
survive itself.
Its death would mean that it no longer equates the 
reality of our presence in the world and to ourselves.55
Adorno writes in this context that museums are like 
family graves of images to which the observer no 
longer has a vital relationship and which are in the 
process of dying. He quotes Valéry’s sublime state-
ment: ‘dead visions are entombed here.’56 Museums 
are mausolea in the sense that they testify to the 
inevitable neutralisation of culture, the fragility of 
the body,49 Proust’s asignifying memory: to make 
the illegible force of time legible by draining the 
intention out of memory’s objects.
In each case, there has to be a break in the circuit 
of usage, a gap, an anomaly that makes the work 
leave behind any referential relation to the world 
so that it can become a veritable work of art. The 
fundamental premise of art’s ‘life’ is the death of the 
living intention of the work: the formal dimension of 
the work of art, its identity, that which is ‘conserved’ 
in it, does not consist in an intentional scheme that 
awaits its own incarnation. On the contrary, as 
Theodor Adorno masterfully puts it, paraphrasing 
Proust: 
What eats away at the life of the artwork, is also its 
own life. […] Works of art can only fully embody the 
promesse du bonheur when they have been uprooted 
from their native soil and have set out along the path 
to their own destruction.50
 
This unworldly dimension of the work is described 
by both Deleuze and Blanchot as the abyss of the 
present, a temporality without present, grasp or 
measure, to which the Ego has no relation and, 
thus, toward which I am unable to project myself. 
This untraceable region ‘forms’ a kind of atopic 
and imagined no man’s land; an Erewhon of 
images, signifying at once the originary ‘nowhere’ 
and the displaced, disguised, modified and always 
re-created here and now. Perhaps Deleuze has the 
same region, the same chaosmos in mind when 
speaking of the sublime in terms of ‘the fundamen-
tally open whole (le fondamentalement ouvert) as 
the immensity of future and past’.51 This veritable 
Bergsonian interiority of time as:
The whole which changes, and which by changing 
perspective, constantly gives real beings that infinite 
space which enables them to touch the most distant 
past and the depths of the future simultaneously, and 
to participate in the movement of its own ‘revolution’.52
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associated with the work of art as a new, fragile and 
finite cosmos the artist has created. Just like Valéry, 
Proust stresses the mortality of artefacts. ‘What 
seems eternal,’ he says, ‘contains within itself the 
impulse of its own destruction.’59
This dialectical attitude brings Proust into conflict 
with Valéry. It makes his perverse tolerance of the 
museums possible, whereas for Valéry the dura-
tion of the individual work is the crucial problem. 
The criterion of this duration is the here and now, 
the present moment. For Valéry, art is lost when 
it has relinquished its place in the immediacy of 
life, in its functional context. The pure work is for 
him threatened by reification and neutralisation. 
And it is exactly this that Valéry recognises in the 
museum, whence his nostalgic mourning for works 
as they turn into relics. Proust begins where Valéry 
stopped – with the afterlife of works of art. For him, 
works of art are more than their specific, context-
bound aesthetic qualities. They are part of the ‘Life’ 
(Deleuze) of the observer, they become an element 
of his consciousness. He thus perceives a level in 
them very different from that of the formal laws of 
the work. It is a level, Adorno writes, set free only by 
the historical development of the work, a level which 
has as its premise the death of the living intention 
of the work. For Proust the latter produces a new 
and broader stage of consciousness, a new and 
broader level of immediacy. His extraordinary sensi-
tivity to changes in modes of experience has, as its 
paradoxical result, the ability to perceive history as 
a landscape, a percept if you will. For Proust, the 
power of history as a process of disintegration is not 
incompatible with the power of art – on the contrary.
If Valéry understands something of the power of 
history over the production and apperception of art, 
Proust knows that even within works of art them-
selves history rules like a process of disintegration. 
Valéry takes offense at the chaotic aspect of the 
museum because it distorts the works’ expressive 
realisation; for Proust this chaos assumes tragic 
the cosmos created by the artist. Valéry’s appeal 
is directed against the confusing overabundance 
of the Louvre. He is not, he writes, overly fond of 
museums. In the Louvre, Valéry feels confronted 
with frozen creatures, each of which demands the 
non-existence of the others – a disorder strangely 
organised. The more beautiful a picture is, the more 
it is distinct from all others; it becomes a rare object, 
unique, and this is counteracted by the over-accu-
mulation of riches in the museum. Art runs the risk 
of thus becoming solely a matter of education and 
information. The shock of the museum brings Valéry 
to a historical-philosophical insight into our destruc-
tion of artworks. There, he says, we put the art of the 
past to death. Valéry grieves over the decontextuali-
sation of the works of art. Painting and sculpture, he 
says, are like abandoned children:
Their mother is dead, their mother, architecture. While 
she lived, she gave them their place, their definition. 
The freedom to wander was forbidden them. They had 
their place, their clearly defined lighting, their mate-
rials. Proper relations prevailed between them. While 
she was alive, they knew what they wanted. Farewell, 
the thought says to me, I will go no further.57
Proust’s view of the museum opposes Valéry’s 
romantic gesture. Adorno mentions a trip Proust 
took to the sea resort Balbec. He remarks on the 
caesura that voyages make in the course of life 
by ‘leading us from one name to another name’.58 
These caesuras are particularly manifest in railway 
stations, ‘these utterly peculiar places […] which, so 
to speak, are not part of the town and yet contain 
the essence of its personality as clearly as they 
bear its name on their signs’. Adorno observes 
how Proust’s memory seems to drain the inten-
tion out of its objects, turning the stations into mere 
historical archetypes. Proust compares the station 
to a museum: both stand outside the framework of 
conventional pragmatic activity, and, Adorno adds, 
both are bearers of a death symbolism. In the 
case of the museum, this death symbolism is one 
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‘forms’ the Deleuzian pathos of art (‘la honte d’être 
un homme’), an unmasking privileged to art, and 
always to be reanimated by generations to come.
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